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Abstract
Ethics and safety research in artificial intelligence is increas-
ingly framed in terms of “alignment” with human values
and interests. I argue that Turing’s call for “fair play for
machines” is an early and often overlooked contribution to
the alignment literature. Turing’s appeal to fair play sug-
gests a need to correct human behavior to accommodate our
machines, a surprising inversion of how value alignment is
treated today. Reflections on “fair play” motivate a novel in-
terpretation of Turing’s notorious “imitation game” as a con-
dition not of intelligence but instead of value alignment: a
machine demonstrates a minimal degree of alignment (with
the norms of conversation, for instance) when it can go unde-
tected when interrogated by a human. I carefully distinguish
this interpretation from the Moral Turing Test, which is not
motivated by a principle of fair play, but instead depends on
imitation of human moral behavior. Finally, I consider how
the framework of fair play can be used to situate the debate
over robot rights within the alignment literature. I argue that
extending rights to service robots operating in public spaces
is “fair in precisely the sense that it encourages an alignment
of interests between humans and machines.
Value Alignment and Turing’s Test
A substantial portion of contemporary research
into ethics and artificial intelligence is devoted to
the problem of “value alignment” (hereafter VA)
(Allen, Smit, and Wallach 2005; Yudkowsky 2008;
Yampolskiy 2013; Soares and Fallenstein 2014;
Russell, Dewey, and Tegmark 2015;
Arnold, Kasenberg, and Scheutz 2017). Rather than de-
riving ethically appropriate action from first principles
or from a direct recognition of the good, VA takes as its
goal the (presumably simpler) task of designing AI that
conforms to human values. AI that reliably conforms to
human values is said to be “aligned”. A primary concern
in this literature is to establish methods that guarantee
alignment, potentially within tight parameters, since it is
argued that even small and seemingly innocuous cases of
misalignment can quickly develop into a serious threat to
general human safety (Yudkowsky 2008; Bostrom 2012;
Babcock, Krama´r, and Yampolskiy 2016).
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There are reasons to be optimistic about VA as an ap-
proach to AI ethics, perhaps most significantly that the
framework of “alignment” seems to lend itself to contem-
porary machine learning techniques like supervised learn-
ing (Mohri, Rostamizadeh, and Talwalkar 2012), where ma-
chines systematically improve their performance relative
to a specified training set. There are also reasons to
be skeptical that today’s machine learning techniques
are adequate for generating the complex forms of align-
ment required for participating in human moral com-
munities (Arnold, Kasenberg, and Scheutz 2017). However,
rather than critiquing the VA literature directly, my goal in
this paper is to reflect on connections between the discourse
on value alignment and the historical discussion of Turing’s
notorious “imitation game”, with the hopes that lessons from
the latter might better inform our developing discussions of
the former.
Turing’s test, originally offered as an alternative to
the question “can machines think?”, has since become
a standard benchmark for evaluating the intelligence of
machines (Turing 1950; Saygin, Cicekli, and Akman 2000;
Copeland 2004; Copeland et al. 2017). The test revolves
around a comparison to human performance: if the ma-
chine cannot be correctly identified by a human interroga-
tor after a few minutes of conversation, it is said to ”pass”
the test and can be called intelligent. The central criterion
for passing the test is indistinguishability from human be-
havior (Dretske 1997; Saygin, Cicekli, and Akman 2000).
We might describe the demand for indistinguishability
in terms of “behavioral alignment”: a machine is be-
haviorially aligned just in case it behaves indistinguish-
ably from a human. (Allen, Varner, and Zinser 2000) al-
ready recognized that since the set of moral behaviors is a
proper subset of the total behaviors, what today is called
“value alignment” can be interpreted as a special case of
behavioral alignment. From this insight they propose a
Moral Turing Test (MTT) (Allen, Wallach, and Smit 2006;
Wallach and Allen 2008; Arnold and Scheutz 2016). The
MTT is passed by a machine that behaves indistinguishably
from a human in a conversation about moral actions.1 Just as
1(Arnold and Scheutz 2016) argue that even a Total MTT varia-
tion, where evaluation of behaviors is not restricted to conversation
but encompasses the full range of moral behaviors, is not sufficient
for saving the MTT as a viable ethical criterion. For this reason, I
passing the original Turing Test is supposed to suggest a de-
gree of intelligence on the basis of behavioral alignment, so
too does passing the MTT suggest a degree of moral agency
on the basis of moral alignment.
Although the Turing Test is widely known and discussed,
it is generally not accepted as a reliable test for intel-
ligence. Criticisms of Turing’s test abound in the litera-
ture, perhaps best summarized by Dretske: ”despite indis-
tinguishability, all is dark...” (Dretske 1997). Critics worry
that the mere imitation of human behavior is not suffi-
cient for either intelligent or moral agency, and so Turing’s
test doesn’t tell us what we want to know (Searle 1980;
Dennett 1981; Dreyfus 1992). Here the theoretical goals of
the MTT come apart from those of VA. Researchers con-
cerned about value alignment don’t care whether the ma-
chine is a genuine moral agent; a pure automaton (like
the Paperclip Maximizer (Bostrom 2003)) might still pose
a threat to humanity if it is sufficiently misaligned. And
conversely, a sufficiently aligned machine is no guarantee
of moral agency, just as convincing automation is no guar-
antee of intelligent agency. For this reason, strong rejec-
tions of MTT sit awkwardly in the literature alongside ex-
pansive research programs into the constraints on align-
ment, even while the former is a clear example of the latter.
For instance, (Arnold and Scheutz 2016) criticize the MTT
as a standard for building moral machines, and yet they
go on in (Arnold, Kasenberg, and Scheutz 2017) to develop
some theoretical constraints on applying machine learning
to value alignment, while drawing no strong connections be-
tween these discussions. The effect is to make it appear as
if the MTT is either irrelevant or unhelpful to the to the dis-
cussion of value alignment.
Arnold et al. reject the MTT on several grounds, in-
cluding that imitation cannot serve as the basis for in-
telligent moral agency. Echoing the traditional criticisms,
they write, ”What becomes ever clearer through explicat-
ing the conditions of an MTT is that its imitative premise
sets up an unbridgeable gulf between its method and its
goal” (Arnold and Scheutz 2016) The framework of an ”un-
bridgeable gap” is familiar from the philosophy of mind
(Dennett 1991), and seems to render Turing’s proposal in-
adequate for the task of developing genuine moral agents.
However, if our task is not to develop intelligent moral
agents per se but merely to align our machines with our val-
ues, than the MTT may continue to prove useful. In the next
section, I argue that Turing’s principle of ”fair play for ma-
chines” (FP) (Turing 1947) provides a non-imitative ground
for evaluating the alignment of machines. I argue that the FP
avoids many of the classic criticisms of Turing’s test, and
provides a satisfying method for applying Turing’s insights
to the problem of value alignment distinct from the MTT.
Fair Play for Machines
(Proudfoot 2017) points to a variety of sources in develop-
ing a rich, comprehensive account of the Turing test (“from
every angle”). Special emphasis is given to his discussion
will not dwell on the restriction to conversation behaviors in this
paper. See (Harnad 1989).
of a “little experiment” (Turing 1948) involving chess play-
ing computers in an experimental design that is clearly the
germ for his landmark 1950 paper. However, curiously miss-
ing from Proudfoot’s analysis (and mentioned only in pass-
ing in (Leavitt 2017)), is a short passage from the end of
Turing’s 1947 Lecture on the Automatic Computing En-
gine to the London Mathematical Society (Turing 1947;
Copeland 2004; Hodges 2012). Here Turing is also con-
cerned with evaluating the performance and ”I.Q.” of chess-
playing computers, which suggests this passage should be
read alongside his 1948 and 1950 papers for a full appre-
ciation of the developing proposal. Since it is so regularly
overlooked, I quote Turing’s argument below in full, with
paragraph breaks and emphasis added:
“It might be argued that there is a fundamental con-
tradiction in the idea of a machine with intelligence.
It is certainly true that acting like a machine has be-
come synonymous with lack of adaptability. But the
reason for this is obvious. Machines in the past have
had very little storage, and there has been no question
of the machine having any discretion. The argument
might however be put into a more aggressive form. It
has for instance been shown that with certain logical
systems there can be no machine which will distinguish
provable formulae of the system from unprovable, i.e.
that there is no test that the machine can apply which
will divide propositions with certainty into these two
classes. Thus if a machine is made for this purpose it
must in some cases fail to give an answer. On the other
hand if a mathematician is confrontedwith such a prob-
lem he would search around a[nd] find new methods of
proof, so that he ought eventually to be able to reach
a decision about any given formula. This would be the
argument.
Against it I would say that fair play must be
given to the machine. Instead of it sometimes giv-
ing no answer we could arrange that it gives occa-
sional wrong answers. But the human mathematician
would likewise make blunders when trying out new
techniques. It is easy for us to regard these blunders
as not counting and give him another chance, but the
machine would probably be allowed no mercy. In other
words then, if a machine is expected to be infallible, it
cannot also be intelligent. There are several mathemat-
ical theorems which say almost exactly that. But these
theorems say nothing about howmuch intelligencemay
be displayed if a machine makes no pretense at infalli-
bility.
To continue my plea for fair play for the machines
when testing their I.Q. A human mathematician has
always undergone an extensive training. This training
may be regarded as not unlike putting instruction ta-
bles into a machine. One must therefore not expect a
machine to do a very great deal of building up of in-
struction tables on its own. No man adds very much
to the body of knowledge, why should we expect more
of a machine? Putting the same point differently, the
machine must be allowed to have contact with hu-
man beings in order that it may adapt itself to their
standards. The game of chess may perhaps be rather
suitable for this purpose, as the moves of the ma-
chines opponent will automatically provide this con-
tact.” (Turing 1947; Copeland 2004)
There are many striking things to note about this passage.
First, Turing is responding to a critic of the very idea of
machine intelligence, whose argument points to some nec-
essary (and therefore unbridgeable) gap between the per-
formance of humans and machines. In this case, the critic
appeals to Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem (Go¨del 1931;
Smullyan 2001) as evidence of such a gap, an objection
he returns to under the heading of “The Mathematical Ob-
jection” in (Turing 1950). Recall that Turing’s major math-
ematical contribution (Turing 1937) is the formal descrip-
tion of a “universal computer”, which can in theory per-
form the work of any other computer. On my interpretation
(Estrada 2014), the universality of his machines is what ul-
timately convinces Turing that computers can be made to
think. Without any assumption of behaviorism or appeal to
a principle of imitation, the syllogism runs as follows: if
the brain is a machine that thinks, and a digital computer
can perform the work of any other machine, then a dig-
ital computer can think. This syllogism is both valid and
sound. However, Turing recognizes that Go¨del’s theorem
shows “that with certain logical systems there can be no
machine which will distinguish provable formulae of the
system from unprovable”. This straightforwardly implies
that there are some things that even Turing’s universal ma-
chines cannot do. This result does not invalidate the syllo-
gism above. Still, Turing’s critics draw an inference from
(1) there are some things machines cannot do, to (2) humans
can do things that (mere) machines cannot do. Although this
inference is clearly invalid,2 arguments of this form per-
sist even among respected scholars today (Penrose 1999;
Floridi 2016). The passage from his 1947 Lecture shows
Turing contending with this perennial challenge several
years before his formal presentation of the imitation game.
In other words, Turing was clearly aware of an “unbridge-
able gap” objection, and both his “little experiment” and the
principle of fair play serve as ingredients in his response. A
full appreciation of Turing’s position in this debate ought to
take this evidence into account.
Second, the core of Turing’s response is to offer a “plea”
for what he calls “fair play for machines”. This suggestion
is proposed in the context of “testing their I.Q.”, making ex-
plicit the connection between FP and the developing frame-
work of Turing’s test. Essentially, Turing is worried about
a pernicious double standard: that we use one standard for
evaluating human performance at some task, and a more rig-
orous, less forgiving standard for evaluating the machine’s
performances at the same task. Other things equal, a double
2Turing’s original response to the Mathematical Objection re-
mains satisfying: “The short answer to this argument is that al-
though it is established that there are limitations to the powers of
any particular machine, it has only been stated, without any sort
of proof, that no such limitations apply to the human intellect.”
(Turing 1950)
standard is patently unfair, and thus warrants a plea for ”fair
play”. Of course, one might worry that the mere fact that
the performance comes from a machine implies that other
things aren’t equal. Since machines are different from hu-
mans, they ought to be held to different standards. But on my
interpretation , Turing is primarily motivated by a conviction
that universal computers can perform the work of any other
machine, and so humans and computers are not essentially
different. Turing’s test isn’t designed to prove that machines
can behave like humans, since in principle this follows from
the universality of the machines. Instead, the test is designed
to strip the human evaluator of his prejudices against the ma-
chines, hence the call for fair play.
Notice that calling a standard of judgment unfair does not
imply that the machines treated unfairly can “think”. There-
fore, FP alone cannot serve as a basis for evaluating the in-
telligence of machines in the style of the Turing Test. And
indeed, Turing’s argument makes clear that his appeal to FP
is concerned not with the intelligence of the machine, but
instead with the standards used to evaluate the machine’s
performance. After all, Turing’s plea is made in defense of
machines that are expected to be infallible, and whose per-
formance might be compromised (by “occasionally provid-
ing wrong answers”) in order to more closely approximate
the performance of a human. Turing’s point is that we’d
never demand a human mathematician to occasionally make
mistakes in order to demonstrate their intelligence, so it’s
strange to demand such performance from the machine. If
Turing’s test is motivated by a call for ”fair play for ma-
chines”, this should inform our interpretation of the test it-
self. Since the principle of fair play does not depend on an
imitative premise, the rejection of Turing’s test on this basis
seems too hasty.
Finally, the quoted passage closes by highlighting the
phrase “fair play for machines” again3, and arguing that “the
machinemust be allowed to have contact with human beings
in order that it may adapt itself to their standards.” Clearly,
Turing is approaching the challenge of evaluating the perfor-
mance of machines, even in purely intellectual domains like
chess, as a problem of behavioral alignment. Moreover, Tur-
ing argues that for machines to achieve that alignment, they
must be allowed certain privileges, in the interest of “fair
play”. Specifically, Turing argues that if we expect the ma-
chine to learn our standards, we must afford access to our
behavior. In other words, he’s arguing that constraints on hu-
3It may be interesting to consider why the phrase ”fair play for
machines” doesn’t appear in the 1950 paper. Many of the argu-
ments from the passage appear in the final section of his 1950, un-
der the subsection “Learning Machines”, where he proposes build-
ing “a mind like a child’s” in response to Lovelace’s Objection
(Estrada 2014). In this section he proposes a number of games to
play with machines, including chess and twenty questions. He also
expresses a worry that “The idea of a learning machine may ap-
pear paradoxical to some readers.” Turing’s 1950’s paper is self-
consciously written to a popular audience; perhaps Turing worried
that a plea for ”fair play for machines”, including those that aren’t
even intelligent, might also confuse his readers too much, and un-
dermine the constructive argument he’s given. Hopefully, readers
70 years later are not so easily confused.
man behavior are necessary to achieve alignment: in howwe
evaluate and interact with out machines. This perspective is
rare even in the alignment literature today, where concerns
are overwhelmingly focused on how to constrain the ma-
chine to stay within bounds of acceptable human behavior.
More importantly, Turing suggests that we must be will-
ing to interact with machines, even those that aren’t intel-
ligent, if we expect these machines to align to our stan-
dards. And this is precisely the kind of interaction Tur-
ing’s proposed imitation game encourages. These reflec-
tions open a new route to defending the importance of
Turing’s test in today’s alignment literature. Turing’s test
is usually understood as a benchmark for intelligence,
and the MTT as a benchmark for moral agency. Com-
mentary traditionally recognizes Turing’s worries about
standards of evaluation (Saygin, Cicekli, and Akman 2000;
Arnold and Scheutz 2016), but they interpret Turing’s imita-
tion game as attempting to settle on some specific standard
of evaluation: namely, indistinguishability from human per-
formance, or perfect imitation, as judged by another human.
If the machine meets this standard, the machine is consid-
ered intelligent. We might call this a “benchmark” interpre-
tation of Turing’s test, or BTT. The MTT is an instance of
BTT that sets the benchmark to imitate human moral behav-
ior, for example. Many machine learning applications today
will present themselves as meeting or exceeding human per-
formance (at discrimination tasks, image recognition, trans-
lation, etc.), a legacy of Turing’s influence on the field. Crit-
icisms of Turing’s test focus on whether this benchmark is
appropriate for evaluating the machine’s performance, with
most concluding it is not an adequate measure of general in-
telligence. But the principle of fair play suggests Turing is
less interested in setting a particular benchmark for intelli-
gence, and more concerned with establishing that the stan-
dards for evaluation that are fair. Call this interpretation the
Fair Play Turing Test FPTT. A machine passes the FPTT
when it meets the same standards of evaluation used to judge
human performance at the same task. On this interpretation,
Turing’s imitation game is meant to describe a scenario of
”fair play” where the human biases against machines can be
filtered out, and the machine could be judged in their ca-
pacity to carry a conversation by the same standards as any
other human. We typically think of someone who can hold
a conversation as being intelligent, so if a machine can also
hold a conversation without being detected as non-human,
we should judge it intelligent too. Not because conversa-
tion is some definitive marker of intelligence, as the BTT
interpretation suggests, but rather because conversation is
a standard that is often used to evaluate the intelligence of
humans, and the principle of fair play demands holding ma-
chines to the same standards. On this interpretation, the sort
of hostile interrogation typically seen in demonstrations of
Turing’s test (Aaronson 2014) seems straightforwardly un-
fair, since we wouldn’t expect an intelligent human to hold
up well under hostile interrogation either.
Since the principle of FP does not depend on imitation, the
FPTT works in a subtly different way than the BTT. Passing
the FPTT doesn’t merely imply a machine performs at hu-
man levels; passing FPTT implies more strongly that the ma-
chine performs at these levels when evaluated by the same
standards used to judge human performance. For instance,
we usually aren’t skeptical of mere imitation when talking to
a human, so raising this concern in the context of evaluating
machine could signal a change in the standards of evalua-
tion, and thus a violation of FP. Cases where machine per-
formance is expected to diverge significantly from humans
might warrant a multiplicity of standards. We might, for in-
stance, expect driverless vehicles to adhere to more rigorous
safety standards than we typically hold human drivers. Rec-
ognizing these misaligned standards as a violation of fair
play doesn’t necessarily imply the situation is unethical or
requires correction. Instead, identifying a failure of fair play
draws attention to the multiplicity of standards for evaluat-
ing a task, and the lack of a unifying, consistent framework
for evaluating all agents at that task. The framework of FPTT
easily extends to evaluating performance at tasks other than
“general intelligence” where we are interested in consistent,
unifying standards, including the task of moral alignment
in particular contexts. (Arnold and Scheutz 2016) reject the
MTT as a standard for evaluating moral agency on the basis
of its imitative premise. But FPTT doesn’t depend on an im-
itative premise, and only checks for alignment with the stan-
dards used to judge humans at a task. In the next section,
I argue that this framework of fair play has direct applica-
tion for evaluating the alignment of robots operating in our
world.
The Rights of Service Robots
Historically, the question of robot rights has
turned on questions of personhood (Gunkel 2012;
Bryson, Diamantis, and Grant 2017). Conditions on person-
hood typically involve both cognitive and moral attributes,
such as ”recognizing the difference between right and
wrong” (Christman 2008). The consensus among scholars
is that robots do not yet meet the conditions on minimal
personhood, and will not in the near future. However, this
consensus is inconclusive, and has been used to argue that
robot rights might be necessary to protect machines that op-
erate below the level of human performance (Darling 2012;
Darling 2015). For instance, in 2017 San Francisco law-
makers implemented restrictions on autonomous delivery
services on sidewalks and public right-of-ways, citing
safety and pedestrian priority of use as motivating concerns
(Rodriguez 2017). The proposal raises a natural question
of whether these robots have the right to use public spaces,
and to what extent a ban on robots might infringe on those
rights. These questions seem independent of more general
concerns about moral agency and personhood that typically
frame the rights debate. Furthermore, it is well known
that service robots operating in public spaces are typically
subject to bullying and abusive behavior from the crowd
((Salvini, Laschi, and Dario 2010; Salvini et al. 2010;
Brscic´ et al. 2015). Protecting robots from such treatment
seems necessary independent of whether they meet strict
conditions for personhood.
Like many cases of moral alignment, the case of the rights
for service robots to operate on public sidewalks seems
to demand a standard for evaluating the performance of
machines that does not turn on any imitative comparison
with human agents. Delivery robots do not have nor require
the intellectual and moral capacities typical of humans; to
compare their operation with human performance seems at
best mismatched, at worst insulting. Interpreted as a bench-
mark of performance, these machines operate well below the
threshold where Turing’s test is relevant and the vocabulary
of rights and personhood applies. In contrast to the bench-
mark interpretation, however, the principle of fair play sug-
gests we look for standards of evaluation that are consistent
across humans and machines. In the case of service robots,
the focus of concern is on the nature of the task these robots
are performing, and the standards already in use for eval-
uating such performances. There’s an obvious comparison
between service robots and service animals that is tempting,
but I think is ultimately unhelpful. Importantly, animals feel
pain and can suffer, and service animals are used to support
persons with disabilities who can’t otherwise access public
resources. Service robots, in contrast, are used by tech com-
panies to better service their clients, and it seems implausi-
ble that they can ’suffer’ in a morally salient way. Given the
distinct nature of these roles, holding service robots to the
standards of service animals seems inappropriate.
A closer analogy to the work of service robots can be
found (Chopra and White 2011), who propose an alterna-
tive approach to robot law centered not on personhood
but instead on a framework of legal agency. A legal agent
is empowered to act on behalf of a principal, to whom
the agent holds a fiduciary duty that contractually binds
the agent to act on the principal’s interest. For instance, a
lawyer or accountant operates as a legal agent in the ser-
vice of their clients. In the context of agency law, an agent’s
right to operate turns both on the capacities of the agent
to faithfully represent the principal, and also on the na-
ture and scope of the role being performed. The framework
of agency law offers a systematic defense of robot rights
which focuses legal and policy attention to the roles we
want robots to play in our social spaces, and the constraints
which govern operation of any agent performing these roles
(Chopra and Estrada in progress). A social role analysis of
robots as legal agents has clear application to the protec-
tion of service robots operating in public spaces, including
delivery robots and self-driving cars. But it also has natural
extensions for the regulation of robots in a wide variety of
other social roles, including robots that provide services in
the context of law and justice, finances, transportation, edu-
cation, socio-emotional support, sex work, public relations,
and security. For instance, agency law provides a straightfor-
ward path to the regulation of bots on social media that are
used to influence voters and elections (Ferrara et al. 2016).
From this perspective, social media bots are operating on
behalf of their operators in the service of specific roles (cam-
paign promotion, electioneering, etc), and therefore fall un-
der the same legal frameworks that already exist to evaluate
the ethics and legality of these activities.
The proposal to adopt robot rights grounded in a frame-
work of legal agency deserves an explicit elaboration outside
the scope of this paper. I raise the suggestion in this context
to demonstrate how the principle of fair play might be used
to guide developing standards for evaluating machine per-
formances. Recall that the principle of fair play asks that we
evaluate the machine according to the same standards used
to judge the performance of a human at the same task. Thus,
FPTT focuses our discussion on the task-specific standards
for evaluation, rather than on the details of the performance
of any particular machine, or the contrasts in performance
across different agential kinds. In this way, FP also suggests
an expansive research agenda for classifying and detailing
the types of roles we might want robots to serve in, and the
constraints on evaluating the performance of any agent fill-
ing that role. For instance, what should social media bots
acting as campaign representatives be allowed to say or do?
This is not an engineering question about the capabilities
of any machine. It is a social policy question about what
machines can and cannot do in the service of their role. If
we want machines to align to our standards of performance,
then Turing argues that fair play must be given to the ma-
chines.
Of course, we don’t want every machine to align to our
standards. If standards cannot be made consistent across hu-
mans and machines, it entails a stratification of the social
order that divides humans from machines. One might worry
that a social role defense of robot rights does not elimi-
nate the stratification, but in fact imposes new social divides
wherever there is a distinction in social roles, and so threat-
ens a conception of rights grounded on the universal and
inalienable rights of humanity. In this way, a social role de-
fense might appear to be a kind of “3/5th compromise for
robots”. This worry is reinforced by a review of the history
of agency law, which itself develops out of a logic of slav-
ery and indentured servitude (Johnson Jr 2016). However,
the social role analysis of agency law provides a way around
this worry by laying out a direct path to full legal agency for
robots. To say that robots serve as agents for principals does
not preclude the robot from being a full legal agent, since
obviously lawyers and accountants retain their personhood
and agency even while acting as an agent for their principal.
And of course, serving as a principal is yet another social
role to perform, one with its own standards of evaluation.
Making the the standards for principals explicit allows for a
robot to serve as principal, first for other robots, perhaps as
a manager or oversight for other robots acting on its behalf,
and eventually to serve as a principal for itself, thus bridging
the gap to full legal agency.
Conclusions
In this article we have reviewed some primary concerns
of the value alignment literature, and shown these interests
were present in the development of Turing’s test as early
as (Turing 1947). We argued that a widespread rejection of
Turing’s test as a standard of intelligence has led scholars
to overlook Turing’s call for fair play as a source of inspira-
tion in developing machines that are value-aligned.We have
proposed an alternate interpretation of Turing’s test which is
inspired by Turing’s call for “fair play for machines”, and
carefully distinguished this interpretation from benchmark
interpretations like the Moral Turing Test. Finally we have
briefly discussed how FPTT might be used to justify a de-
fense of robot rights and sketch out a path to full agency on
the basis of a social role analysis of agency law.
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